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I. Preliminary Remarks
On 25 April 2018, the Commission brought forward its Proposal for a
Directive on various issues of cross-border mobility,1 which aims at intro-
ducing rules for cross-border conversions and divisions and at improving
the legislative framework for cross-border mergers. The issue had been on
the legislative agenda for a long time, starting with the unsuccessful Pro-
posal for a Directive on Seat Transfers.2 Since 2005, Directive 2005/563
(now art. 118–134 Directive 2017/11324) has regulated cross-border mergers.
However, market participants,5 legislative bodies,6 commissioned studies,7
1 Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and
divisions COM(2018) 241 final (hereinafter ‘the Proposal’).
2 Commission, Proposal for a Fourteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on
the Transfer of the Registered Office or the De Facto Head Office of a Company from
One Member State to Another of 20 April 1997.
3 Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, Official
Journal (hereinafter OJ) L310/1.
4 Directive (EU) 2017/1132 relating to certain aspects of company law, OJ L169/46 (here-
inafter ‘Dir. 2017/1132’).
5 For an overview of consultations carried out by the Commission see Explanatory Mem-
orandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), p. 14 et seqq.
6 See e.g. recently European Parliament Resolution of 13 June 2017 on cross-border mer-
gers and divisions (2016/2065(INI)). See also the Commission, 2012 Action Plan on
Company Law and Corporate Governance (COM/2012/0740 final), p. 12 et seqq.
7 See e.g. Bech-Bruun/Lexidale, Study on the application of the cross-border mergers di-
rective (2013) (<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0291
c60a-df7a-11e5-8fea-01aa75ed71a1> last accessed: 20 December 2018); Jessica Schmidt,
Cross-border mergers and divisions, transfers of seat: Is there a need to legislate? Study
for the JURI Committee (2016) (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
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and academics8 contend that further legislative steps are requir-
ed.
Concurrently, the ECJ has addressed the issue of cross-border mobility on
the basis of the freedom of establishment under art. 49 TFEU in a series
of seminal judgments over the last ten years. The principal issue in these
cases was whether the home Member State can raise barriers to outgoing
transfers. Already in its Cartesio decision,9 the ECJ opened the way for a
liberal approach as it stated in an obiter dictum that art. 49 TFEU prohibits
barriers to “the actual conversion of such a company, without prior winding-
up or liquidation, into a company governed by the law of the Member
State to which it wishes to relocate [...], unless it serves overriding require-
ments in the public interest”. While the ECJ’s Vale decision10 seemed to re-
strict the application of the freedom of establishment to situations invol-
ving the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment
in the host Member State for an indefinite period, the recent Polbud de-
cision11 made clear that the ECJ12 follows a wider approach: a conver-
sion into a company governed by the law of another Member State is pro-
tected by art. 49 TFEU even if the location of the real head office does not
change. In other words, no real economic link to the host Member State
is necessary. Of course, this means that there is a free choice of law not
just upon foundation of the company – as had been settled by the ECJ’s
decisions starting with Centros13 –, but also at a later stage via reincorpora-
tion.
Irrespectively of whether this is the correct reading of primary law and with-
out going into further details, these decisions highlight the importance of the
issue. Without any doubt, the ECJ’s judgments by themselves cannot solve all
STUD/2016/556960/IPOL_STU(2016)556960_EN.pdf> last accessed: 20 December
2018).
8 See e.g. Jesper Lau Hansen, “The Vale Decision and the Court’s Case Law on the Na-
tionality of Companies”, ECFR 2013, 1, 15 et seqq.;Marek Szydlo, “The Right of Com-
panies to Cross-Border Conversion under the TFEU Rules on Freedom of Establish-
ment”, ECFR 2010, 414, 441 et seqq.; Eddy Wymeersch, “Is a Directive on Corporate
Mobility Needed?”, European Business Organization Law Review 2007, 161, 169.
9 ECJ, 16 December 2008, Cartesio, C-210/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, para. 113.
10 ECJ, 12 July 2012, Vale, C-378/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:440, para. 34.
11 ECJ, 25 October 2017, Polbud, C-106/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:804.
12 However, this is in stark contrast to Advocate General Kokott’s opinion in this case; cf.
Kokott, 4 May 2017, Polbud, C-106/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:351.
13 ECJ, 09 March 1999, Centros, C-212/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126.
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the practical problems connected to issues of cross-border mobility.14 As this
group has already pointed out,15 legislation in this area is in line with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and should be one of the top priorities for EU company
law: the Court’s decisions on freedom of establishment of companies identify
the role for Community secondary legislation rather than remove the need for
it. Therefore, we strongly endorse the Commission’s Proposal in principle.
The following paper looks at some central issues after introducing the pur-
poses of the Proposal and after providing a brief overview of its contents (II.).
It will start by examining the method by which the Proposal intends to harmo-
nise the Member State’s interests with the ECJ’s reading of the freedom of es-
tablishment (III.). The paper will then examine the three core interests that can
be affected by a cross-border transaction: creditors (IV.), shareholders (V.), and
employees (VI.). We do not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the
Proposal, especially not on a technical level. Our more moderate aim is an
overall assessment, based on the Proposal’s central pillars.
II. The Proposal’s Objectives and its General Approach
The Proposal’s basic objective is to enable companies to make use of the free-
dom of establishment; however, at the same time it purports to protect stake-
holders, i.e. creditors, minority members, and employees.16 Additionally, the
proposal takes account of the public interest, especially by trying to avoid un-
due tax advantages by “artificial arrangements”. As always, there is a certain
trade-off between enabling provisions for the company on the one hand and
protection of stakeholders on the other as overly protective provisions can di-
minish the attractiveness of measures designed to promote mobility. Whether
this is the case must be determined on the basis of a careful analysis of each
provision. However, it is safe to make two general remarks in this respect:
First, protective provisions must be applied to all comparable transaction
modes. If, for instance, the shareholders were given a right to exit in a cross-
border conversion but not in a cross-border merger, the resulting loophole
would certainly be made use of by those who decide upon the structure of the
14 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), p. 3. For the limits to this so-
called negative harmonisation in the area of reincorporations see Carsten Gerner-
Beuerle/Federico Muciarelli/Edmund Schuster/Matthias Siems, “Cross-border reincor-
porations in the European Union: the case for comprehensive harmonisation”, Journal
of Corporate Law Studies 18 (2018), 1, 34 et seqq.
15 ECLE, The Future of European Company Law (2012) (<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2075034> last accessed: 20 December 2018).
16 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), e.g. p. 2 and 4.
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transaction. Thus, consistency is one important issue in order to prevent un-
justified biases and consequent distortions of choices.17 Additionally, the legis-
lator also has to consider that combinations of a purely national transaction
(e.g. a domestic division) with another cross-border transaction (e.g. a subse-
quent cross-border conversion) can have the same effect as a one-step cross-
border transaction (e.g. a cross-border division). We show in this paper that
some issues remain open in this respect.
Second, in order to promote cross-border mobility it is useful to achieve a
common framework in all Member States. The Bech-Bruun/Lexidale-study on
the implementation of the Cross-Border Merger Directive shows that the ap-
proach pursued by that Directive, namely a light-touch approach giving con-
siderable leeway toMember States in core issues, did not achieve all the desired
results.18 According to that Directive, in the field of creditor protection in
cross-border mergers Member States can apply their regulations for domestic
mergers,19 which are based on art. 99 Dir 2017/1132 calling for “an adequate
system of protection of the interests of creditors”. The tremendous differences
between Member States, e.g. on the commencement of the protection period
before or after the merger takes effect (ex ante- or ex post-approach) and on the
nature of the protection offered to creditors, make the merger process very
complex and constitute a strong deterrent to cross-border mergers.20 What
seems to be needed is full harmonisation at least for the most critical issues.
The Proposal takes a first step in that direction by introducing detailed me-
chanisms for the protection of creditors and minority members. However, it
does not take the second step of introducing these measures as fully harmo-
nised.21 Rather, Member States are left with the possibility to introduce further
protection devices (at least as long as they comply with primary law). Even if
this may be a politically prudent move in order to achieve the necessary sup-
port from the Member States, on a conceptual level it is unfortunate that the
Proposal is thus deprived of the benefits of full harmonisation.
17 See also the Association of German Notaries, Reaction to the Company Law Package
(<http://www.dnotv.de/wp-content/uploads/StN-Master-Company-Law-Package-
2018-07-04_final.pdf> last accessed: 20 December 2018).
18 Bech-Bruun/Lexidale (fn. 7), p. 31–38. See also Geert Raaijmakers/Thijs Olthoff,
“Creditor Protection in Cross-BorderMergers: Unfinished Business”, Utrecht Law Re-
view 4 (2008), 34.
19 Art. 121 (1) (b) and (2) Directive (EU) 2017/1132. See also Jessica Schmidt, “EU Com-
pany Law Package 2018 – Mehr Digitalisierung und Mobilität von Gesellschaften
(Teil 1)”, Der Konzern 2018, 229, 238 et seqq.
20 See also Martin Winner, Creditor Protection in Mergers in Europe, in: Erika Kovacs/
Martin Winner (ed.), Stakeholder Protection in Restructurings, in print.
21 Very clearly: Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), p. 19.
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In its scope of application, the Proposal goes far by regulating cross-border
mergers, divisions and conversions. However, some important transaction
types are missing:
As far asmergers are concerned, the Proposal covers neither triangular mergers,
whether forward or reverse, in which the shareholders of the target company
receive shares not in the acquiring company but in its parent company, nor com-
pulsory share exchanges; the latter can either takeplace in the formof a schemeof
arrangement – which is binding on all affectedmembers, creditors, and the com-
pany if sanctioned by a court – or through a merger of the different shareholder
groups by majority decision without a merger at the asset level. Especially the
share exchange would help to avoid difficulties in someMember States with the
conceptof universal succession,22 although it is understandable that theProposal
does not cover all transactionswith similar effects to amerger.23
Additionally, only divisions (both full and partial) in which newly formed
companies are created are covered by the Proposal.24 Therefore, for a cross-
border division by acquisition a two-step approach of, for instance, a domestic
division followed by a cross-border merger will remain the method of choice;25
the Commission’s explanation, namely that cross-border mergers by acquisi-
tion entail a high risk of abuse and necessitate the involvement of many autho-
rities,26 is not convincing as with the two-step approach the same issues exist
but cannot even be assessed in one proceeding. Interestingly, not just full divi-
sions and partial divisions (or spin-offs) are covered but also non-proportion-
ate divisions, in which not all members receive the same proportion of shares in
all new companies.
As a result, we think that the (already ambitious) scope of the Directive should
encompass some additional transaction types; this would have huge practical
importance without the necessity to address many additional issues. In any
case, we support the Commission’s approach of introducing rules on cross-
border divisions as they provide added value by helping companies to avoid
22 See Luca Enriques, “A New EU Business Combination Form to Facilitate Cross-Bor-
der M&A: The Compulsory Share Exchange”, European Company Law 11(2014), 214.
23 E.g. stock-for-assets exchanges when followed by the dissolution of the target.
24 Art. 160b (3) Proposal. See also Association of German Notaries (fn. 17), p. 44; Associa-
tion of German Attorneys, “Reaction to the Company Law Package” Neue Zeitschrift
für Gesellschaftsrecht 2018, 857, 866; Jessica Schmidt, “EU Company Law Package
2018 – Mehr Digitalisierung und Mobilität von Gesellschaften (Teil 2)”, Der Konzern
2018, 273, 275.
25 Similarly, a cross-border division into a newly formed company can be combined with a
subsequent domestic merger.
26 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), p. 8.
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cumbersome two-step transactions (national division plus cross-border mer-
ger or conversion).27
III. Limited Endorsement of Artificial Arrangements
The ECJ’s Polbud decision of October 201728 clearly states that the freedom of
establishment covers the change of the applicable company law even if it is not
accompanied by a transfer of the real head office. That is remarkable as the
Advocate General’s opinion in the case was more conservative; even though
she did not prescribe a change of the head office, she held that the freedom of
establishment is applicable to a conversion “in so far as that company actually
establishes itself in the other Member State, or intends to do so, for the purpose
of pursuing genuine economic activity there”.29 However, the ECJ held, in line
with earlier judgments, that “a Member State may adopt measures in order to
prevent attempts by certain of its nationals to evade domestic legislation, given
that, in accordance with settled case law, it is open to a Member State to adopt
such measures”.
The Polbud judgment presented the Commission with a hard choice. In order
to make a regulation of conversions palatable to Member States on a political
level – a prerequisite for the necessary majority in the Council – it was deemed
necessary to introduce some kind of filter on such transactions. At least some
Member States are worried by the fact that without such barriers regulatory
competition in company law will not only be relevant to the initial choice of
company law30 but also at any later stage as the company can easily reconsider
its initial choice via re-incorporation in another Member State without any
concomitant change in the running of its business. However, even assuming
that the Commission sympathised with this stance, the Polbud decision most
likely has closed down any approach requiring some type of economic link to
the receiving Member State although the Draft Report of the European Parlia-
27 Cf., however, the diverging approach in Committee on Legal Affairs of the European
Parliament, Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conver-
sions, mergers and divisions 2018/0114(COD) 90 (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-625.524+02+DOC
+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN> last accessed: 20 December 2018).
28 ECJ, 25 October 2017, Polbud, C-106/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:804.
29 Kokott (fn. 12), para. 43.
30 Which is generally accepted since the ECJ decisions in ECJ, 9 March 1999, Centros,
C-212/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126; ECJ, 5 November 2002, Überseering, C-208/00,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:632 and ECJ, 30 September 2003, Inspire Art, C-167/01, ECLI:EU:
C:2003:512.
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ment’s Committee on Legal Affairs on the Proposal31 advocates reintroducing
such a requirement.
Thus, the Commission has introduced another instrument for conversions and
divisions in art. 86c (3) and art. 160d (3) of the Proposal: the departure Mem-
ber State32 “shall not authorise the cross-border conversion (or division) where
it determines, after an examination of the specific case and having regard to all
relevant facts and circumstances, that it constitutes an artificial arrangement
aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or
contractual rights of employees, creditors, or minority members.” art. 86n and
art. 160p empower the competent authority to carry out an in-depth assess-
ment looking at all the relevant facts of the case. This assessment is to be made
within the framework of a report by an independent expert, which inter alia
has to describe in detail the factual elements necessary to evaluate whether the
transaction constitutes such an artificial arrangement;33 however, for micro and
small enterprises34 no independent expert report will need to be prepared.
Generally, at first glance the proposed exception for artificial arrangements is a
shrewd move. The Member States when legislating or, at the very latest, when
applying the national law based on the Directive will determine what constitu-
tes an artificial arrangement, which is prejudicing the relevant interests. Addi-
tionally, the provision is (probably deliberately) vague, which has the advan-
tage that each Member State is able to project its perceptions into the wording,
although the Proposal ultimately does not substantially curb the possibility to
reincorporate but only clamps down on somehow fraudulent transactions.
However, this also means that Member States have to accept that their reading
of the provision will be subject to review by the ECJ. Whether this is sufficient
for a political compromise, remains to be seen. Member States may take the
easy option of blocking the entire Proposal and curbing cross-border mobility
by not providing a legislative framework.
On a more technical level, a cross-border conversion leading to the application
of a legal system without any real link to the company may already be seen as
constituting per se an “artificial arrangement”. That, however, will not be suffi-
31 Committee on Legal Affairs of the EP (fn. 27), p. 46 et seqq.
32 As far as the destination Member States is concerned, the conversion in substance is a
foundation with a contribution in kind, which will be subject to its company law
(art. 86c (4) of the Proposal). Thus, there is little need for additional rules protecting its
interests.
33 Art. 86g (3) (b) and Art. 160 i (3) (f) of the Proposal.
34 As defined in Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2013 concerning the definition
of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ L124/36.
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cient as the artificial arrangement must, indeed, be aimed at35 obtaining undue
tax advantages or at prejudicing stakeholder interests.
We understand the gist of the first instance, already developed extensively in
EU tax case law,36 which deems abusive „wholly artificial arrangements“, i.e.
arrangements that lack any economic substance and whose sole purpose is to
circumvent the application of the concerned Member State’s legislation.37 We
would like to point out that EU tax law follows a different approach: art. 6
Directive 2016/116438 stipulates that for the purpose of calculating tax liability
Member States shall ignore artificial arrangements that are put in place for the
main purpose of obtaining undue tax advantages. This ex postmechanism does
not affect the validity of the transaction as such but combats artificial arrange-
ments by ignoring them for tax law purposes only; this targeted approach is
probably superior.
Additionally, we have some doubts as to the second instance: The Proposal
contains numerous rules designed to protect the interests of the creditors, the
minority members, or the employees, which will be dealt with below.Minority
members get an exit right, creditors are entitled to receive collateral if their
claims are endangered, and employees are protected against a loss of represen-
tation on the board. Obviously, an artificial arrangement cannot prejudice
these rights as long as the instruments for their protection are adequate. In our
reading, this leaves few cases in which Member States can block a transaction;
additionally, if a Member State considers these rights to be inadequate, it can
introduce additional rules protecting members or creditors. As a result, the
power granted to Member States seems to be very limited;39 if this is the under-
standing in the Council as well, negotiations may very well become protracted.
35 We believe that this does not require subjective intent but that objective effect is suffi-
cient.
36 See e.g. ECJ, 16 July 1998, ICI, C-264/96 ECLI:EU:C:1998:370, para. 26; ECJ, 12 Sep-
tember 2006,Cadbury Schweppes,C-196/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:544, para. 49, 50, 51, 55.
37 However, it is difficult to determine ex ante if an arrangement is artificial in this sense;
see Jaime Sanchez, “Cross-border conversions and ex-ante control of artificial arrange-
ments: is this an adequate reaction to Polbud?”, Oxford Business Law Blog (2018)
(<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/09/cross-border-conver-
sions-and-ex-ante-control-artificial-arrangements> last accessed: 20 December 2018);
Segismundo Alvarez, “The Commission’s company law package: overview and critical




38 Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly
affect the functioning of the internal market, OJ L193/1.
39 In a similar vein Association of German Attorneys (fn. 24), 858.
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However, we think that the rule can serve as an emergency break in egregious
cases of violation of stakeholder interests and as such has value.
As far as the practical application of such a rule is concerned, we doubt
whether administrative or judicial bodies in all Member States would be able
to arrive at a well-founded judgment; certainly, the registrars in most countries
would be overwhelmed by such a task.40 The Proposals solution, namely em-
ploying an expert, depends on whether such experts can be truly independent
and have a strong backbone; practical experience in other areas of company life
is not always encouraging. Therefore, in our opinion the negotiations should
focus on designing rules to safeguard the expert’s independence as far as possi-
ble. Certainly, it is not a good solution to drop the requirement of an expert
report entirely and put the responsibility squarely on national authorities.41 It
is even less convincing that according to the Proposal no expert has to be ap-
pointed for micro and small enterprises.42
Finally, we find it very disturbing that, in line with the current situation ac-
cording to Directive2017/1132, there is no corresponding regulation for
cross-border mergers43 or the transfer of the registered office of an SE44. This,
of course, is an invitation to circumvent application of the rule in critical cases,
which can be done easily by setting up a company in the destination Member
State with the minimum capital and then merging the existing entity into it. As
the Proposal is drafted, Member States do not have the authority to block such
a transaction even if it constitutes an artificial arrangement within the meaning
explained above. We think that this inconsistency must be remedied urgently if
the prohibition of such artificial arrangements is to be maintained.
Summing up, the issue of barriers to the freedom of establishment for the pur-
pose of combating evasion of domestic legislation is a central issue of the Pro-
posal, especially as it goes to the core ofMember States’ interests. We think that
the Commission has made a good first move by introducing a provision in line
with the ECJ’s Polbud decision. However, given the inherent limitations of the
Proposal’s approach, we very much doubt whether this will be the end of the
matter.
40 Although in some countries judicial registrars are commonly checking the transaction in
substance, at least summarily.
41 This, however, seems to be the solution favoured by parts of the EP; see Committee on
Legal Affairs of the EP (fn. 27), p. 55 et seqq.
42 See also Schmidt (fn. 24), 278 et seqq.
43 See also Association of German Notaries (fn. 17), p. 29; Association of German Attorneys
(fn. 24), 857 et seqq; Schmidt (fn. 24), 276.
44 See Sanchez (fn. 37).
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IV. Creditors
As already mentioned, the system for the protection of creditors in cross-bor-
der mergers leaves a lot of discretion to the Member States. This has been cri-
ticised as an obstacle to cross-border mobility. The Proposal reacts by introdu-
cing a harmonised approach to creditor protection, which follows similar lines
for conversions, mergers, and divisions as far as possible. However, the Propo-
sal only follows a minimum harmonisation approach.45
Starting with cross-border mergers, Member States may require that the board
of each merging company declare that they are unaware of any reason due to
which after themerger the new companywill be unable tomeet due liabilities; if
the Member State chooses to do so, liability for false statements may be the re-
sult.46 It is unclearwhy theProposal explicitly empowersMember States todo so
as it follows aminimum harmonisation approach anyway.
More importantly, the Proposal opts for an ex ante-approach. First, the draft
merger terms have to include “details on the safeguards offered to creditors”.47
This is probably not supposed to mean that the company has to offer such
safeguards48 but only that they have to be included in the terms if so offered;
however, this is far from clear and should be stated explicitly. In any case, if the
creditors are not satisfied with the terms offered, they can petition for adequate
safeguards within one month of the disclosure of the draft terms;49 that means
that the petition has to be made at the day of the general meeting deciding on
the merger at the latest. Although the provision does not state clearly what the
petitioners have to bring forward, we infer from art. 126b (3) that they have to
demonstrate that there exists a reasonable likelihood their rights will be unduly
prejudiced; this should be stated more distinctly as well.50
Of course, the uncertainty whether such claims will be made provides a major
obstacle to cross-border mergers. It is very fortunate that art. 126b (3) (a) pro-
vides a mechanism for reducing this uncertainty: the company may disclose a
report by an independent expert, which has to state that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the creditors’ rights are unduly prejudiced.51 Although the Pro-
45 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal (fn. 1), p. 19.
46 Art. 126b (1) of the Proposal.
47 Art. 122 (n) of the Proposal.
48 See also Art. 126b (3) (b) of the Proposal, which makes it clear that such safeguards are
optional.
49 Art 126b (2) of the Proposal.
50 See also Association of German Notaries (fn. 17), p. 38; Association of German Attorneys
(fn. 24), 860 et seqq.
51 Supportive also Schmidt (fn. 19), 239.
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posal does not stipulate it clearly, we understand this to mean that in this case
the creditors have no right as to additional safeguards; this is a major incentive
for the companies to try to obtain such a report. Thus, the Proposal follows a
gatekeeper approach;52 however, apart from the fact that the expert has to be
“appointed or approved”53 by the competent authority, issues of the rules for
the appointment and the qualification of the gatekeeper are left to the Member
States. Given that Member State’s experiences with the quality of experts di-
verge due to varying local circumstances, the approach may have different
practical effects among Member States.
It is more difficult to understand the second exception in art. 126b (3) (b), ac-
cording to which the creditors are deemed not to be prejudiced if they have a
claim against a third party or the company resulting from the merger of at least
the same value as the original claim “andwhich is of a credit quality at least com-
mensuratewith the creditor’s original claim immediately after completion of the
merger”; additionally, the creditor has to be able to bring the claim in the same
jurisdiction as the original claim. The purpose is clear: if the claim’s quality is not
affected by the merger, or if a claim of equal credit quality is granted against a
third party in the draft merger terms, there is no justification to order additional
safeguards. However, it is unclear who decides upon the credit quality; the in-
dependent expert is not mentioned in art. 126b (3) (b). Is it supposed to be a
decisionby a credit rating agency?Or is this just a clarification for circumstances
to be taken into account by the independent expertwhen hemakes his judgment
on whether the rights of creditors are unduly prejudiced?We prefer the last ap-
proach, but we suggest that this should be clarified in the text.
In general, we consider the approach to be feasible even if details should be
improved. It is probably not advisable to specify the types of safeguards the
competent authority can choose from in order not to curtail judicial discretion.
Finally, we do not see a grave problem in the fact that the regimes for domestic
and cross-border mergers drift apart; in a purely domestic scenario, it is appro-
priate to leave the protection of creditors to Member States.54
52 See e.g. Reinier Kraakman, “Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy”, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2 (1986), 53; William
A. Klein/John C. Coffee, Business Organization and Finance,10th ed., 2007, p. 218 et
seqq.
53 Which probably means that the authority must follow a proposal for the expert made by
the company, unless there are reasonable grounds for withholding that approval. Ob-
viously, there is a danger that experts appointed by the company will be more pliant,
unless this danger is countered by strong reputational incentives for the experts.
54 See Raaijmakers/Olthoff (fn. 18), 38.
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The same rules apply for cross-border conversions. We would like to raise the
question whether this is really adequate. In a cross-border merger, creditors are
endangered primarily by the fact that both the composition of assets and the
circle of creditors change; this may be to the advantage of some creditors but to
the disadvantage of others. This complex situation is the main justification for a
strict system of creditor protection. Additionally, creditors will be subject to a
different company law,55 which may be less creditor friendly, e.g. by having
more permissive rules on distributions; they may also have to bring their claim
in another jurisdiction. In a cross-border conversion, neither the asset base nor
the circle of creditors change; the only changes are in the applicable company
law and, at least sometimes,56 in a different venue for claims. Thus, a system of
creditor protection, which probably has been designed for mergers, is applied
to conversions as well even though these pose fewer dangers to creditors.
Without having a definite answer, we tend to think that a system addressing
these two specific issues directly might be a better solution.
With divisions, the issue is a bit different as the main danger to creditors is not
the mingling of assets, which have been separated, but the division of formerly
unified assets and their allocation to different groups of creditors. The Propo-
sal first contains rules designed to ascertain that each asset and liability is allo-
cated to one company;57 as a default rule the assets and liabilities are allocated
to all companies in proportion to the net assets they have received. More im-
portantly and in deviation from art. 146 (3) Directive 2017/1132 for domestic
divisions,58 all companies shall be jointly and severally liable if the creditor
does not obtain satisfaction from the recipient company his claim has been
allocated to; however, this liability of the other recipient companies is limited
to the value of the net assets allocated to each company. The further rules on
the protection of creditors, especially as to the right to petition for adequate
safeguards, correspond to the situation in mergers. As, due to the division of
assets and liabilities, the dangers to creditors are different but at least as grave as
in mergers, the instruments are generally adequate; apart from that the same
remarks as to mergers apply.
55 Of course, this does not refer to the law governing the company’s obligation itself,
which does not change as a result of the merger; cf. ECJ, 7 April 2016, KA Finanz AG,
C-483/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:205.
56 This, of course, depends on the applicable provisions of the Brussels Ia-Regulation
(Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the re-
cognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L351/1)
and any contractual provisions.
57 Art. 160e (1) (m), (2) and (3) of the Proposal.
58 Which leaves options to Member States as to the type of liability.
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V. Minority Members
The second group of stakeholders to be protected are the companies’ share-
holders who disapprove of the transaction; they need protection as the merger,
etc., affects them even if they vote against. From a theoretical perspective, this
is crucial; in practice, it is not an issue if cross-border mobility measures con-
cern only group restructurings without any minority shareholders (which
seems to be common) or are supported by all shareholders. Of course, an
overly elaborate system of shareholder protection may act as a barrier to
cross-border transactions if minority shareholders are involved; it is important
to get the balance right. While the Proposal goes much further than the current
legislation for cross-border mergers, this is due to the fact that currently the
issue is left to the Member States;59 for the reasons described above, we think
that it would be preferable to introduce adequate minority protection mea-
sures in European legislation but would favour fully harmonized rules.
First and foremost,minorityprotection is achievedby themajoritynecessary for
approval of the transaction in the generalmeeting. TheProposal leaves leeway to
the Member States: under existing law, they can stipulate the necessary super-
majority for a cross-bordermerger, whichmay not be less than two thirds of the
votes attached either to the shares or to the subscribed capital represented;60 this
remains unchanged.For cross-border conversions anddivisions,Member States
may provide for a majority of at least two thirds and up to 90% of these votes;
however, the thresholdmaynotbehigher thanforcross-bordermergers.61Wedo
not have any arguments for further harmonisation on thismatter.
Second,art. 124oftheProposal significantly increases the informationcontained
in the management report to be made available to the members before they ap-
prove the transaction. Apart from valuation issues, the provision makes special
reference to the implications of the cross-border merger onmembers and to the
remedies available to them. Unanimously, the members of the merging compa-
nies can waive this requirement.62 However, here EU law ends up being more
flexible forcross-bordermergers than fordomesticones; if this is a soundexemp-
tion, it should probably be available for all types ofmergers, whether cross-bor-
der or domestic, andnot be left to the discretionof theMember States.63
59 See art. 121 (2) Directive (EU) 2017/1132.
60 Art. 93 (1) and art. 122 (1) Directive (EU) 2017/1132. Under certain conditions a simple
majority may suffice; see art. 93 (1) subpara. 2 Directive (EU) 2017/1132.
61 Art. 86 i (3) and art. 160k (3) of the Proposal. This seems to be impossible if a Member
States avails itself of the opportunity presented by art. 93 (1) subpara. 2 Directive (EU)
2017/1132 mentioned in the preceding footnote.
62 However, members cannot dispense with the report to employees.
63 See art. 95 (3) Directive (EU) 2017/1132.
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For minority protection in the narrower sense of the word, the Proposal pro-
vides two different instruments: on the one hand, an exit right in cross-border
conversions, divisions, and mergers; on the other, the right to challenge the
exchange ratio in cross-border divisions and mergers. Even though the Propo-
sal does not state this, clearly members can only make use of one of these
rights.
As far as the exit right is concerned, the Commission is proposing the intro-
duction of an appraisal right system in Europe for dissatisfied shareholders.
There is almost no reflection on advantages or disadvantages, such as the bur-
dens in terms of costs, time delays, etc. European experience with such rules is
lacking; experiences with similar issues in the squeeze out regimes are, at least
in some Member States, not very positive. We would be surprised if these parts
of the proposal were not subject to further discussion.
The Proposal takes a clear position on who can disinvest: only those share-
holders without voting rights and those with voting rights who did not vote
for the approval.64 We do not argue with this decision, but we want to note that
it would also be possible to restrict the exit right to those shareholders who
actually voted against the transaction;65 this, however, would incentivise share-
holders to vote against and might actually block the transaction while shares
not represented in the vote will not usually be counted as a vote against. The
major argument against an exit right for a large number of shareholders is, of
course, the outflow of liquid funds resulting from it. However, in our experi-
ence, companies can usually find ways to make a transaction conditional upon
sufficient shareholders not making use of or even waiving their exit right in
order to avoid an excessive outflow of cash; probably, it would be helpful if
the Directive clarified this.
However, we do take issue with another decision in the Proposal: in mergers,
members of both companies have an exit right, not just those of the transfer-
ring company, who are merged across the border (see art. 126a (1) of the Pro-
posal: “members of the merging companies”); similarly, with divisions all
shareholders have the exit right and not just those who find themselves in a
company subject to another jurisdiction after the transaction (art. 160l (1) of
the Proposal). This is excessive. For members of the acquiring company, it does
not matter whether the assets that company acquires are those of a domestic
entity or of a foreign one; either they should have an exit right in both domestic
and cross-border mergers or in neither. The exit right for the (former) mem-
bers of the transferring company is justified not by the merger as such but
because after the merger they will become members of a company governed
64 See art. 86 j (1), art. 126a (1) and art. 160l (1) of the Proposal.
65 This is suggested by the Association of German Attorneys (fn. 24), 860.
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by foreign law. That is the reason why, e.g., Austrian and German legislation
provide an exit right only to shareholders of the transferring company.66 Were
that otherwise, domestic merger legislation would also have to provide for an
exit right, which it typically does not.67 Along these lines, art. 126a (1) of the
Proposal is inconsistent with the rules of Directive 2017/1132 on domestic
mergers, which do not foresee such an exit right. Mutatis mutandis, the same
argument holds for cross-border divisions: an exit right can only be justified
for members who, after the division, find themselves in a company governed
by another company law. We strongly recommend the appropriate changes in
the text.68
The proposal is agnostic as to who shall offer the compensation: it may be the
company itself, the remaining members, or a third party.69 If it is the company,
it must observe the rules governing the acquisition of its own shares.70 One can
argue that the company should always be the debtor; importantly, this would
clearly determine the type of default risk exiting shareholders have to accept.
The cash compensation must be adequate. Art. 86 j on cross-border conver-
sions does not contain any further specifications. However, the rules on
cross-border mergers stipulate that the independent expert shall review the
adequacy of the cash compensation having regard to the market price of the
shares prior to the announcement of the planned transaction and to the value
of the company before the merger.71 By contrast, art. 160l on cross-border di-
vision does not contain any such rules.72 We have two comments on that. First,
we think that it is the correct decision not to try regulating the adequacy in
detail but to make clear that the book value is not relevant – as the Proposal
does for mergers.73 Second, we fail to understand why the independent expert
66 See for details art. 10 Austrian EU-VerschG and art. 122 i German UmwG.
67 There are exceptions where the legislator tries to further other aims, as for example in
many Nordic countries where a squeeze out regime was introduced to stimulate simpli-
fied mergers between a parent company and a fully owned subsidiary: if the parent
reaches 90%, the minority can be squeezed out, and the minority shareholders have a
corresponding right to exit.
68 Cf., however, Schmidt (fn. 19), 237 with certain sympathies for the proposal.
69 See art. 86 j (2), art. 126a (2), and art. 160 l (2) of the Proposal. The English version seems
to (wrongly) imply that the compensation is „paid to” the company, etc., although it
should be read to mean that the shares „are disposed to”, i.e. “sold to” the company.
70 Art. 86 j (3), art. 126a (3), and art. 160 l (3) of the Proposal.
71 See art. 126a (5) of the Proposal.
72 However and contrary to the text, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal
(fn. 1), p. 29, holds that the independent expert shall review the adequacy also in divi-
sions. See Schmidt (fn. 24), 281.
73 In this crucial respect the Proposal addresses the issue of valuation; cf., however,
Schmidt (fn. 19), 241.
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does not have a similar role in conversions and divisions; in both cases – with
the exception of transactions concerning micro and small enterprises – an ex-
pert has to be appointed in any case (in order to provide the authority with
information on the factual basis for its assessment on “artificial arrange-
ments”). We recommend rolling out the provision of art. 126a (5) to conver-
sions and divisions.
Crucially, the Proposal holds that members cannot challenge the transaction
on the ground that the compensation offered is not adequate.74 Instead, it pro-
vides a special procedure in which those members who have actually chosen to
exit the company can “demand the recalculation of the cash compensation”
before a court.75 Although this rule clearly impacts negatively on transaction
security, as it can lead to additional payments, the impact is limited in various
ways. First, the offer will not open again for acceptances if the compensation is
raised;76 therefore, members who think that the compensation is inadequate
have to accept the compensation before instigating proceedings and thus run
the risk to be left with the initial amount in case of an unfavourable judgment.
Second, the Proposal does not stipulate that an award has effect erga omnes, i.e.
as against all members who have accepted; rather it is in the discretion of Mem-
ber States to limit the effects of an award to the initial parties to the proceedings
and to those who have joined them.77 Of course, that may lead to the surprising
result that some shareholders who have accepted the offer get a top-up, while
others do not – a solution which is foreign to many legal systems; in favour of
the rule one can argue that only shareholders active in pursuing their rights and
willing to take the risks of taking legal action should benefit from an award.
Third and connected to this last point, cost rules for these proceedings are left
to the Member States, which will be an important factor for the practical im-
portance of these rules as shareholders will be incentivised to bring claims if the
costs are to be borne by the acquiring company while a rule exposing share-
holders to the full cost risk will have a strong deterrent effect. As a result, it is
clear that Member States are left with large discretion in order to strike a prop-
er balance between the interests of the company together with the majority of
the members as opposed to the dissenting minority. With some justification,
one could critically comment that the Proposal shies away from some hard but
crucial policy decisions in favour of national legislators.
74 Art. 86 i (5), art. 126 (4) (b), and art. 160k (5) of the Proposal.
75 Art. 86 j (5), art. 126a (6), and art. 160 l (5) of the Proposal.
76 However, this is a recommendation of theAssociation of German Attorneys (fn. 24), 860.
77 Joint proceedings must be possible; art. 86j (6), art. 120a (7), and art. 160l (6) of the
Proposal.
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As a final remark we would like to comment briefly on the issue of the law
applicable to the cash consideration and issues of jurisdiction. The Proposal
rightly holds that the law of the departure Member State governs the exit right
and that the courts of that Member State have jurisdiction.78 That is justified by
the fact that the members probably use their exit right precisely because they
want to avoid being affected by the application of foreign law.
We now turn to the second remedy, the right to challenge the share exchange
ratio. Again, the Proposal tries to improve transaction security by stipulating
that the merger or division cannot be challenged solely because the share ex-
change ratio has been set inadequately.79 We would like to point out that, in the
case of an inadequate share exchange ratio, very often the information given to
the shareholders on that ratio, especially in the management report according
to art. 124, will be incorrect as well. The Proposal does not address the issue
whether such misinformation gives shareholders a right to have the resolution
set aside; if the aim is to exclude a challenge in cases of incorrect valuation, it
probably is preferable to cover cases of misinformation on these issues as well –
an approach chosen by some legislators.80 Second, challenging the resolution is
not possible on the ground that the total value of the shareholdings allocated to
a member is not equivalent to the value of the shares held by that member in
the company being merged or divided.81 It is reasonably clear what this means
in the case of a division, where the value of all shares received in a non-propor-
tionate division (i.e. where members do not receive shares in all the new com-
panies proportionately) may be lower than the original value of the shares in
the company being divided. In the case of mergers, however, this will usually
coincide with an inadequate share exchange ratio.
Instead of challenging the entire resolution, members have the right to chal-
lenge only the share exchange ratio if it is set inadequately.82 Thus, the current
awkward coexistence of two different national systems of remedies in cross-
border mergers (challenging the resolution in its entirety or only adjusting the
exchange ratio) will be a thing of the past; as a consequence, art. 127 (3) Direc-
tive 2017/1132 is to be abolished.
According to the Proposal, the court can then order the company to pay com-
pensation as cash payment; alternatively, upon the request of either party the
78 Art. 86 l (6), art. 126a (7), and art. 160 l (6) of the Proposal. See Schmidt (fn. 19) 237 et
seqq.
79 Art. 126 (4) (a) and art. 160k (5) (a) of the Proposal.
80 See e.g. art. 243 (4) German AktG and art. 225b Austrian AktG.
81 Art. 126 (4) (c) and art. 160k (5) (c) of the Proposal.
82 Art. 126a (8) and art. 160 l (7) of the Proposal.
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court can order the company to provide additional shares.83 In many instances,
this latter option will be preferable as it serves to minimise cash outflow and
leads to the outcome which would have been achieved, had the ratio been set
adequately in the first place. However, as far as the other company’s share-
holders are concerned, providing additional shares or – although probably to
a lesser extent – an additional cash compensation results in a different deal than
the one they approved; from their point of view, setting aside the resolution
may be the preferable option. In practice, the issue will be moot once the mer-
ger is entered into the register; as it usually cannot be nullified after that mo-
ment,84 some type of cash settlement will have to happen in any case. There-
fore, we think that the Proposal’s general approach is appropriate,85 but we
want to raise some issues as to details:
First, only members “who did not oppose the cross-border merger” or divi-
sion may challenge the share exchange ratio. Obviously, this has to be under-
stood against the background of the exit right: opposing shareholders should
leave the company altogether. However, we do not think this is adequate.
Members who oppose the transaction may have varying reasons to do so: they
may think that the transaction is a bad idea, irrespective of the share exchange
ratio, or they may oppose only the share exchange ratio but not the transac-
tion as such. In the second circumstance, the proposal forces members to vote
in favour of the transaction and then rely upon the courts to determine the
correct ratio; if they vote against and happen to be part of the minority, they
will have no remedy. We think that the correct solution would be either to
open the remedy to all members irrespective of their vote86 or to restrict it to
those members who have voted against the proposal. In any case, the Proposal
rightly provides the shareholders of both merging companies with this reme-
dy.87
Second, the text leaves open who benefits from an award: only those share-
holders who have joined the proceedings or all shareholders? If only the clai-
mants receive cash or additional shares, there is some tension with the principle
that all members have to be treated equally, which will be especially salient if
only some members receive additional shares.88 However, a case can be made
that shareholders should be forced to actively pursue their rights, which may
also help to avoid free-riding behaviour. Alternatively, one could restrict any
83 Art. 126a (9) and art. 160 l (8) of the Proposal.
84 See art. 108 Directive (EU) 2017/1132.
85 See also EP Resolution (fn. 6), para. 11; Schmidt (fn. 19), 237.
86 That is the solution in Germany and Austria; cf. art. 15 (1) German UmwG (for the
transferring company) and art. 225c (1) Austrian AktG (for both companies).
87 Positive also Schmidt (fn. 19), 238.
88 Cf. the criticism by Schmidt (fn. 19), 238.
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effect erga omnes to those shareholders who voted against the proposal. If the
current approach is followed, it probably would be expedient to explicitly
mention that members can join proceedings instigated by others, similar to the
wording for proceedings on the adequacy of the cash compensation in the case
of the exit right.89
Third, the proposal clarifies that the law applicable to the company resulting
from the cross-border merger shall govern the obligation.90 There is no specific
provision on jurisdiction, but the claim will have to be brought against the
company resulting from the merger, as proceedings can only be initiated with-
in one month after the merger takes effect; this leads to jurisdiction in the
Member State of that company.91 This is adequate as the members did not exit
the company, thus signalling their acceptance of the change of applicable law.
However, this may be a motivator for making use of the exit right, which is
governed by the law of the transferring company and adjudicated by the courts
of that Member State; thereby, dissenting shareholders can avoid the applica-
tion of a (foreign) legal regime perceived to be less protective of shareholders.
Finally, these rules are also supposed to apply to cross-border divisions.92
However, the issue is different in that context as cross-border divisions by ac-
quisitions are not covered by the Proposal.93 Therefore, a “share exchange ra-
tio” as in mergers simply does not exist. However, there is a similar issue in
non-proportionate divisions, as members receive shares in some newly formed
companies but not in others, or at least not in the same proportion as in the
company being divided.94 In that situation, some members may be worse off
overall after the transaction to the benefit of others, which is why the former
need protection. However, it is probably difficult to achieve this protection by
the same means as in mergers as there are a number of unresolved issues:
Which of the newly formed companies shall make any additional cash pay-
ments? In which company should the member receive additional shares? The
Proposal only states that the “court has the power to order the recipient com-
pany”, without stating which recipient company. Should this be left to the clai-
mant, i.e. to each claimant individually?Will they then not choose according to
the remedies provided by the law applicable to that company?95 We think that
89 See art. 126a (7) of the Proposal.
90 Art. 126a (10) and art. 160 l (9) of the Proposal.
91 Cf., however, Schmidt (fn. 19), 238: jurisdiction in the Member States of all merging
companies.
92 Art. 160 l (7) and (8) of the Proposal.
93 Art. 160b (3) of the Proposal.
94 See also Association of German Attorneys (fn. 24), 866 et seqq.
95 See art. 160 l (9) of the Proposal.
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the rules on minority protection for divisions need to be refined further.96 We
would also like to point out that non-proportionate divisions are especially
dangerous to shareholders and are therefore subject to additional restrictions
in some Member States.97
VI. Employees
The third core issue are the rights of employees, especially as far as representa-
tion of the employees on either the management or the supervisory board is
concerned. This is likely to be another politically decisive issue as some na-
tional trade unions are dissatisfied with the current situation for cross-border
mergers and are likely to oppose further extension of these principles.98
There are two principal legal devices used in the Proposal for the protection of
the interests of employees. The first is disclosure, which is applied across all
three transactions, so that there will be an additional, non-waivable disclosure
requirement for cross-border mergers as compared with the current provi-
sions.99 At the same time as the board of the initiating company provides its
report to the members,100 it must also produce a report explaining the implica-
tions of the proposed transaction for employees and communicate it to the
employees’ representatives (left to be defined in national law). In identical
terms across the three types of transaction the employees’ report must deal
with the implications of the proposed transaction for the future business of the
company and the management’s strategy, the implications for employment re-
lationships, and any “material changes” in conditions of employment and the
location of the company’s business. The employee representatives also receive
copies of the members’ report and vice versa. The representatives may make
representations to the company and, probably more usefully from their point
of view, to the independent expert and the competent authority (in the case of
96 Similar Association of German Attorneys (fn. 24), 866 et seqq.
97 See e.g. art. 128 German UmwG (unanimous decision necessary); art. 8 (3) Austrian
SpaltG (90% majority required coupled with an exit right for dissenting members).
98 See e.g. for Germany Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Stellungnahme des DGB zum




g=AOvVaw0I1rdaqC2r2dqTmI1JY5xW> last accessed: 20 December 2018).
99 Art. 86f, 124a, and 160h of the Proposal.
100 Which must be made available to the employee representatives of the concerned com-
panies or, in absence of such representatives, their employees themselves (art. 86e (3)
for conversions; art. 124 (3) for mergers; art. 160g (3) for divisions).
216 European Company Law Experts (ECLE) ECFR 1–2/2019
conversions and divisions101). Given the potential of the transactions to impact
adversely upon employees, we think this additional disclosure is valuable, even
if the impact of the report on the shareholders is speculative. Some national
systems give employee representatives greater possibilities to influence compa-
nies’ strategic decisions. The minimum harmonisation approach of the Propo-
sal here plays the useful role of not putting these national provisions in jeopar-
dy.
Where the cross-border conversion is undertaken wholly for choice of com-
pany law reasons, it is possible that there will be no impact on the employees,
because labour laws tend to be territorial and so unaffected if the company’s
operations remain in the same place. However, there is one major exception to
this statement, i.e.where the company laws of a particular jurisdiction are used
to protect the interests of the employees, by giving them the right to influence
(in some way) the choice of persons to fill a proportion of the board seats. Here
a mere change of company law to one which has no such provisions raises an
issue of major concern to the employees. This issue bedevilled all proposals for
EU instruments relating to cross-border transactions, until a way forward was
found in the Statute for the European Company (SE). The principle adopted
was “no escape but no extension”. This is the second employee protection
technique to be found in the Proposal.
Following this principle, for all three transactions considered in the Proposal,
the starting point is that the applicable board influence rules are those of the
jurisdiction in which the company resulting from the transaction is incorpo-
rated (i.e. the transferee jurisdiction for conversions or the place where the
resulting company is incorporated for mergers and divisions). This implements
the “no extension” part of the principle where the ultimate jurisdiction has no
or only weak board influence rules for employees. However, the starting point
undermines the “no escape” principle where one or more of the prior jurisdic-
tions contains board influence rules which are stronger (in the sense of influen-
cing a higher proportion of board seats) than those of the resulting jurisdiction.
In this case, the starting point is displaced by an application in the resulting
jurisdiction of “standard rules” laid down in Directive 2001/86/EC (the SE
Directive), which are essentially the rules of the prior jurisdiction which were
the strongest in relation to board influence, amended so as to permit all em-
ployees to take part in the board representation system, no matter where in the
EU they are employed. The standard rules are in turn subject to the capacity of
the employee representatives and the relevant companies to agree a different
outcome through a negotiating process structured by the relevant EU instru-
ment. This approach was implemented for cross-border mergers in what is
101 Art. 86g (4) and art. 160i (4) of the Proposal.
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now art. 133 (2) (a) and (b) of Directive 2017/1132, and is applied to conver-
sions and divisions in art. 86l (2) (a) and (b), and 160n (2) (a) and (b) of the
Proposal.
However, in a curious additional requirement, art. 133(2) of Directive 2017/
1132 also requires negotiation and possible application of the standard rules
where one of the merging companies employs at least 500 employees and is
operating under an employee participation system. Here the provisions of the
jurisdiction of the resulting company are displaced without the need to carry
out a comparison of the participation rules in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ jurisdic-
tions. Given that the strength of a jurisdiction’s participation rules is measured
by the number of board seats over which the employees can exercise influence
(whilst ignoring differences in the type of influence, for example, appointment
rights or only consultation rights), it is not clear that the comparison avoided is
burdensome. In any event, this rule is reformulated in the Proposal, in relation
to conversions and divisions, so as to address a more obvious problem.102 For
conversions and divisions, the “negotiation with standard rules procedure”103
is triggered even where the relevant company is not subject to an employee
participation system in its prior jurisdiction. However, the trigger operates
only where, over a period of six months prior to the publication of the draft
terms of the transaction, the company has employed on average a number of
employees equivalent to 80 per cent of the threshold which would trigger the
participation system in the prior jurisdiction. This provision reduces the incen-
tive for a company to carry out a conversion or division when it is in the vici-
nity of the application of participation rules in its existing jurisdiction in order
to be able to pass beyond that threshold without becoming subject to the par-
ticipation obligation (or an enhanced participation obligation). Thus, the “no
escape” element of the principle is strengthened. This seems an acceptable ob-
jective, even though it is likely to reduce at the margin the number of transac-
tions taking place which are not driven by avoidance objectives. However, if it
is a good rule for conversions and divisions, it is far from clear why it is not
applied to mergers.
On a more general level, the current solutions for the issue of board level em-
ployee representation are very complex and hard to apply in practice. Already,
the original approach in the Statute for the European Company was compli-
cated; this has been rolled out with modifications for cross-border mergers and
102 See art. 86 l (2) and 160n (2).
103 Curiously, art. 86 l as currently worded clarifies beyond doubt that negotiations have
to be started but does not make completely clear that the rules of the Member State of
departure on board level employee representation will start to apply once the company
resulting from the transaction triggers the threshold at a later stage. This should be
introduced in the text.
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now for other cross-border transactions, which has even increased the com-
plexity.104 Politically, trade unions and the European Parliament are not satis-
fied, which threatens any proposal on cross-border mobility. Probably, a more
general change of the approach could help to tackle the issue at its roots. Thus,
bearing in mind the effects of the European Company on the corporate gov-
ernance of European firms105 according to the national jurisdictions,106 the par-
ties to the ongoing negotiations in the Council might also consider alternative
regimes for the protection of employee rights, ideally based on a more Eur-
opean-minded mechanism for employee participation.
With Denmark and France, two EU Member States departed from the tradi-
tional approach of representing only employees who are employed in the com-
pany’s country of incorporation.107 In other countries, there is a lively discus-
sion whether such an extension should be incorporated into national law and
even whether European law requires such an approach.108 However, the ECJ
held in its Erzberger judgment that employee representation can be restricted
to employees employed in the country in which the company is incorpo-
rated.109 In its Polbud judgment, the ECJ postulated that employee representa-
tion is a rationale which can justify restrictions of the freedom of establish-
ment – of course only if these restrictions are appropriate for securing the at-
tainment of their objective, namely protecting the interests of employees.110
On that basis, an alternative regime to be considered might include a general
option for the transferor state to continue applying its national regime on em-
ployee representation to companies having changed the applicable law, be it as
a result of a merger, a conversion, a division or the formation of a European
Company. Of course, any such regime would have to be in line with European
104 On a technical level, it is very unfortunate that the Proposal contains numerous refer-
rals to other instruments and thus cannot be understood by itself.
105 For whom with the introduction of the European Company the choice between differ-
ent board models became a European standard for national company laws; seeOECD,
OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017, 93 (<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/
Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf> last accessed: 20 December 2018).
106 Generally, seeHorst Eidenmüller/Andreas Engert/Lars Hornuf, “Incorporating under
EuropeanLaw:TheSocietasEuropaea as aVehicle forLegalArbitrage”, EuropeanBusi-
nessOrganizationLawReview2009, 1;MarkusRoth,“EmployeeParticipation,Corpo-
rate Governance and the Firm: A transatlantic view focused on Occupational Pensions
andCo-determination”, EuropeanBusinessOrganizationLawReview2010, 51.
107 Sec. 141 Danish Companies Act, art. L225-27-1 French Code de Commerce.
108 For Germany see the contributions in Matthias Habersack/Caspar Behme/Horst Ei-
denmüller/Lars Klöhn (ed.), Deutsche Mitbestimmung unter Reformzwang, 2016.
109 ECJ, 18 July 2017, Erzberger, C-566/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:562.
110 ECJ, 25 October 2017, Polbud, C-106/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:804.
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standards111 and could not restrict employee participation to employees in the
country in which the company was incorporated before the cross-border
transaction. Rather, such board level employee representation would have to
cover at least all employees working in the European Union112 as far as both
the right to appoint members and the right to become a member of the board
are concerned.
Minimum requirements for employee representation based on national re-
gimes would have to be incorporated into the Directive and to be equivalent
to the standard regime. The Directive should then ensure that all such em-
ployee representation regimes are compatible with the national systems for
corporate governance. The nomination and election of employee representa-
tives might be delegated to national works councils or the European works
council.
Of course, many details would have to be fleshed out, e.g. on the open ques-
tion of what should happen when transferors from various Member States par-
ticipate in the cross-border transaction. This also refers to the question
whether the application of this regime should be mandatory. On the one hand,
referring to national regimes allows the implementation of cost efficient proce-
dures and can avoid delays in cross-border transactions due to a prior negotiat-
ing procedure. On the other hand, negotiations between management and em-
ployee representatives lead to alternative and tailor-made solutions, which ide-
ally will be better suited to the needs of the company.113 We think that this can
tip the balance; then, the transferor state system need not be the only solution
available to the company.
Certainly, this very rough draft is not the only solution. But perhaps a change
of perspective could help in bringing forward a new approach with majority
appeal.
111 Martin Henssler, “Die Zukunft der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung im euro-
päischen Rechtsrahmen“ Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 2018, 174, 195, calls for European
standards to allow employees to vote for employee representatives in all Member
States.
112 For this view in the German national discussion see Hans-Jürgen Hellwig/Caspar
Behme “Die deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Visier von Brüssel? ”, Die
Aktiengesellschaft 2011, 740.
113 For the importance of negotiated solutions see Horst Eidenmüller/Lars Hornuf/Mar-
kus Reps, “Contracting Employee Involvement: An Analysis of Bargaining over Em-
ployee Involvement Rules for Societas Europaea”, Journal of Corporate Law Stu-
dies 12 (2012), 201.
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VII. Final Remarks
Summing up, we think that the proposal’s general approach is excellent. We
also think that there is a real necessity for a Directive on the issue of cross-
border mobility. Therefore, we strongly endorse the Commission’s ambitious
proposal in principle.
However, in many details we see room for improvement. First, this regards the
technical level where many details are not fully thought out (e.g. the instances
in which creditors are deemed not to be unduly prejudiced). Second, we think
that some political choices are doubtful (e.g. the exit right in mergers for mem-
bers of both companies). Third, not in all instances the rules on cross-border
conversions, mergers, and divisions are internally harmonised, the clearest ex-
ample being the check for “artificial arrangements”, which is not in place for
cross-border mergers.
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